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This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are
farsighted : players evaluate the desirability of a “current” move in terms of its
consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs. We define a concept
of equilibrium which takes into account far-sighted behavior of agents and allows
for limited cooperation amongst agents. We show that an equilibrium process of
network formation exists. We also show that there are network structures in
which no equilibrium strategy profile can sustain efficient networks. We then
provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium process will yield
efficient outcomes.
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In several social and economic contexts, the structure of interactions be-
tween individuals is best described as a network. The precise structure of
interaction across players may be crucial in determining the outcome. Ex-
amples include channels of information ﬂow (Bala and Goyal (2000), Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson (2001), Bramoull´ e and Kranton (2002) and Kariv
(2002)), trading networks (Tesfatsion(1997,1998) and Weisbuch, Kirman and
Herreiner(1995)), mutual insurance (Fafchamps and Lund (1997) and Genicot
and Ray (2003)), technology adoption (Conley and Udry (2002), Chatterjee
and Xu (2002) and Bandiera and Rasul (2002)) and buyer-seller networks
(Kranton and Minehart (2000, 2001) and Wang and Watts (2002)).1 Most of
these papers explicitly adopt the network formalism, and describe the space
of interactions as a graph, where the set of nodes coincides with the set of
agents, while an arc between two nodes indicates the existence of bilateral
interaction between the corresponding agents.
The theoretical literature on networks, starting from Aumann and Myer-
son(1988) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), emphasizes two related issues.
The ﬁrst issue is the determination of the structure of networks which will
be formed if links are established voluntarily by agents so as to maximize in-
dividual self-interest, while the second issue is concerned with whether such
1Dutta and Jackson (2003) contains a collection of papers which examine various issues related to network
structures.endogenous networks are socially eﬃcient.
Following Aumann and Myerson, the typical approach has been to model
network formation in a static framework, 2 though some degree of farsighted-
ness (for instance via oﬀers and counteroﬀers) can be accommodated even in
this context.3 A recent departure is Jackson and Watts (2002), which models
network formation as an intertemporal process with individuals breaking and
forming links as the network evolves dynamically. At the same time, individ-
uals are assumed to act myopically: their decisions are guided completely by
current payoﬀs, although the process of network formation takes place over
real time.
Jackson and Watts argue that this form of myopic behaviour makes sense
in large networks where players’ information may be limited to their imme-
diate “neighborhood”, or if players discount the future heavily. To be sure,
there would be intrinsic interest in the opposite presumption as well: that
agents behave in a farsighted manner and take into account the intertempo-
ral repercussions of their own decisions. A principal aim of this paper is to
formalize this idea in the context of network formation.
Our main methodological tool is a variant of the framework introduced
by Konishi and Ray (2003) to analyze coalition formation when players are
2See, for instance, Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), Dutta, van den Nouweland and Tijs (1998), and Slikker
and van den Nouweland (2000, 2001).
3See, for instance, Currarini and Morelli (2000) and Page, Wooders and Kamat (2001).farsighted. At ﬁrst sight, our modiﬁcation appears to be simply a special
case: instead of arbitrary coalitions being active at any date, we only permit
a (randomly chosen) pair of agents to be active at the start of a period.
However — and here the structure of a network is used to full eﬀect — each
agent has natural “unilateral” domains of action. These are the network links
that each of the agents has with other agents. An agent can destroy such links
unilaterally, and does not require the consent of her partner to do so. At the
same time, the pair act together on an equally natural “bilateral” domain.
This concerns the formation of a link between the pair. Link formation must
be a joint decision. Therefore, while only special “coalitions” can form, they
are only enjoined to partly cooperate.
This sort of structure raises interesting conceptual issues, and we cannot
pretend to have dealt with them in an entirely satisfactory way. Surely, all
actions pertaining to the bilateral link between a pair are commonly observed
by the two players, and can therefore serve as correlation devices for their
unilateral actions concerning other links. In particular, when a “bilateral
deviation” occurs from some ongoing prescribed strategy, both players will be
aware of this occurrence. In contrast, we assume that a unilateral deviation by
a player that breaks links other than the one with her partner cannot be used
as a conditioning device by the partner. We are aware, of course, that this
restriction is not entirely satisfactory — we rule out bilateral conditioning
on unilateral action — but our own attempts to deal with both types ofconditioning have led us into diﬃcult terrain (concerning existence, even in
mixed strategies) and we have settled for the more modest advance in this
paper.
We show in Theorem 1 that a Markovian equilibrium process of network
formation exists. An example demonstrates that the equilibrium may neces-
sitate the use of mixed strategies.
We use our solution concept to tackle the question of eﬃciency in networks.
It is well-known that “stable” networks may not be eﬃcient, and the reason
for this is simple. When a link is formed, or destroyed, the players involved
do so with their own gain in mind. At the same time, these actions also aﬀect
the payoﬀ of other players, and so a wedge is driven between stability and
eﬃciency. Theorem 2 restates this in an explicitly dynamic context, using
our solution concept: there are network structures where the process will
not converge to any eﬃcient network for any equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
This is the dynamic counterpart of the conﬂict between individual incentives
and social eﬃciency demonstrated by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for static
networks.
A simple way of seeing this conﬂict (at least for some equilibria) is to
study network games where link formation is always proﬁtable in the static
sense (to the pair which forms the link). Call this property link monotonicity.
Of course, when players i and j form an additional link, some player k maysuﬀer a loss in current value. This implies that the complete network is not
necessarily socially eﬃcient. Nevertheless, Theorem 3 establishes that there
is some equilibrium at which the complete graph is reached in the limit from
all initial networks.
Yet other questions remain. For instance, how good is farsighted network
formation at resolving “weaker” eﬃciency issues that stem, for instance, from
nonconvexities or increasing returns? In particular, consider situations in
which a “small” number of links are costly (to those who form them), while a
larger number of links is beneﬁcial to all. Jackson and Watts (2002) observe
that myopic agents cannot capture the beneﬁts from such situations: the
process may not get oﬀ the ground if initial returns are negative. No pair
of agents may agree to form the ﬁrst link if the immediate beneﬁt is smaller
than the cost, even if subsequent beneﬁts are exceedingly large.
At ﬁrst sight, it appears that farsightedness would automatically take care
of this problem. A matched pair of agents would surely realize the future gains
from linking, even if those beneﬁts are not to be had in the short term. Yet
this behavior applied across the board cannot constitute an equilibrium, for
then a matched pair would prefer not to form a link until such time as a large
number of links have already been built up. This would enable then to save
on the transition costs when there are a small number of links. Just because
agents are farsighted does not mean that they are impervious to short-term
costs. Faced with a less costly transition path they would surely prefer suchan alternative.
Notice that these eﬃciency issues are not as weak as coordination failures.
There is some element of coordination, in that the eﬃcient outcome is easy
enough to sustain as an equilibrium, provided one starts there. But there is
also a genuine absence of common interest: starting from the null network,
for instance, a player would prefer that other players take the lead in link
formation before plunging in herself. These phenomena have been noted in
other contexts (see Chamley and Gale (1994) and Adser` a and Ray (1998)).
Fortunately, we are able to show in Theorem 4 that the complete graph
(which must be socially eﬃcient) will be the unique absorbing limit of the
network formation process for some equilibrium proﬁle.
Of course, “static” coordination failures can arise even in our dynamic
framework. We provide a particularly stark example of this in Example 4,
where we show that all matched pairs may break all links at the complete
graph even when it is the unique socially eﬃcient network. An implica-
tion of such static coordination failures is that typically eﬃciency cannot be
sustained at all equilibria.2 Network Structures
Let I be a ﬁnite index set of n players, and g an undirected graph on I. Such
a graph, or network, is formally just a collection of ij pairs, the interpretation
being that i and j are “linked”.4 We use the notation g + ij to denote the
new graph obtained from g by linking i and j.
A component of a network g is a subset c of g such that no i 2 c is linked
outside c and such that every distinct i and j in c are directly or indirectly
linked.5 Let N(c) denote the set of individuals who are connected in c. Let
C(g) denote all the components of g.
Let G denote the set of all graphs on all nonempty subsets of I. The
complete network, denoted ˜ g, is the graph where all individuals are linked to
each other.
Given any graph g, and component c in C(g), w(c;g) is the value or total





We will say that w is an additive function if the value of any component c is
independent of the structure of links of players not in c. In this case, we will
4Because the graph is undirected, these links are reciprocal. For analyses of network structures which are
directed graphs, see Bala and Goyal(2000) and Dutta and Jackson (2000).
5Thus isolated singletons are components by deﬁnition.simply write w(c). Notice that an additive function w is a generalization of
TU-characteristic functions in cooperative game theory. However, our more
general formulation allows for externalities across components of a graph, and
so represents a generalization of partition functions since the value of a com-
ponent depends not only on the coalition structure as in partition functions,
but also on how the players in c are linked to each other.
Let W be the set of all worth functions deﬁned on all (c;g) pairs, where g
is a network and c a component of g.
2.1 Allocation Rules
An allocation rule is a mapping a : G £ W ! Rn such that
P
i2I ai(g;w) =
w(g), for all worth functions w and graphs g. The rule speciﬁes the (one-
period) payoﬀs to each player i for every conceivable network and worth
function. We will refer to the pair (a;w) as a network structure.
An allocation rule satisﬁes component balance if for all w 2 W, for all
g 2 G, and for all c 2 C(g),
P
i2I(c) ai(g;u) = w(c;g), where I(c) is the set
of agents who appear in c. This restriction rules out any cross-subsidization
across links.
An allocation rule is anonymous if it distributes payoﬀs that depend only
on player position in the network, and the particular worth function, and notplayer labels. Formally, if ¼ is a permutation of I, let g¼ be the appropriate
transformation of g, and for any w, deﬁne w¼ by w¼(g¼) = w(g). Then a is
anonymous relative to (g;w) if for any permutation ¼, a¼(i)(g¼;w¼) = ai(g;w).
Say that the rule is anonymous (without qualiﬁcation) if it is anonymous
relative to every (g;w).
Speciﬁcally, the anonymity of a requires that the information used to de-
cide on allocations be obtained only from the function w and the particular
network g, and not from the label of a player. In particular, observe that the
anonymity of an allocation rule implies that individuals who are in symmetric
positions in a network are assigned the same allocation, if the underlying w
treats such individuals equally, but not necessarily otherwise.
One rule which is both component balanced and anonymous is the component-
wise egalitarian allocation rule. This rule distributes worth equally within
each component of a graph. That is, letting ae denote the
component-wise egalitarian rule, we have




; where c 2 C(g);i 2 I(c):2.2 Eﬃciency
One can attach diﬀerent notions of (static) eﬃciency to network structures.6
For instance, eﬃciency could correspond to maximizing total utility: a graph
g is strongly eﬃcient if w(g) ¸ w(g0) for all g0 2 G.
A more conservative deﬁnition would allow for limited transferability, so
that the distribution of payoﬀs is taken into account. A graph g is (weakly)
eﬃcient relative to (a;w) if there is no other g0 2 G such that ai(g0;w) ¸
ai(g;w) for all i 2 I with strict inequality for some j 2 I.
2.3 Some Restrictions on Network Structures
Two speciﬁc network structures will play a role in what follows. First, a
network structure (a;w) exhibits link monotonicity if for all i;j 2 I, for all
g, ai(g + ij;w) > ai(g;w) and aj(g + ij;w) > aj(g;w) whenever ij 62 g.
Thus, link monotonicity requires that an individual’s payoﬀ is increasing in
the number of her own links.
To be sure, link monotonicity allows for the possibility that an individual’s
payoﬀ may go down if other players set up links (not with that player).
In particular, the complete network ˜ g may not be eﬃcient even when the
network structure displays link monotonicity. The example below shows that
6See Jackson (2001).when jNj = 3, the complete network may violate strong eﬃciency. More
complicated examples can be constructed to illustrate the possible violation
of (weak) eﬃciency when jNj ¸ 4.
Example 1 Let N = f1;2;3g. The function w is symmetric with w(fijg) =
2;w(fij;jkg) = 7=4;andw(˜ g) = 3=2. Moreover, ai(fijg;w) = aj(fijg;w) =
1, ai(fij;jkg;w) = ak(fij;jkg;w) = 1=4, aj(fij;jkg;w) = 5=4, and al(˜ g;w) =
1=2 for all l 2 N. Obviously, link monotonicity is satisﬁed, but the complete
network is ineﬃcient.
A network structure (a;w) displays increasing returns to link creation
(IRL) if
(i) w is additive and w(˜ g) > 0,
(ii) whenever c is a nonsingleton component of some g with w(c) ¸ 0, then
w(c) < w(c0) for all c0 ¾ c,
(iii) if i 2 I(c), but ij = 2 g, then ak(g + ij;w) > ak(g;w) for k = i;j.
The deﬁnition is complicated to state but the main idea is very simple. A
network structure satisﬁes IRL if along every nested chain of “increasingly
connected” networks, there is a threshold (nonempty) network for which the
worth turns nonnegative, and both aggregate payoﬀs as well as payoﬀs of
individuals who form extra links increase as the network becomes larger.Of course, link monotonicity and IRL are diﬀerent conditions. The for-
mer applies to all w, not just additive ones, while the latter is restricted to
the additive case. At the same time, the latter condition only imposes link
monotonicity on a subcollection of components, not everywhere, though it
also requires that aggregate worth also increase over this subcollection along
a nested sequence of components. In particular, IRL guarantees that the com-
plete network is the unique strongly eﬃcient network. In contrast, we have
already described an example to show that ˜ g may not be strongly eﬃcient
when the network structure satisﬁes link monotonicity.
3 Some Examples
In this section, we give some examples to illustrate the framework developed
here.
3.1 The Connections Model.
This is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Links represent social rela-
tionships. Individuals i and j are “friends” if they are linked together, and
friendship is valuable. Individuals also beneﬁt from indirect relationships -
a “friend of a friend” also brings some beneﬁt. The beneﬁt deteriorates in
the ‘distance’ of the relationship. Let ¼ < 1 be the beneﬁt that i gets froma direct link with j, and ¼2 the beneﬁt that i gets from someone who is at a




¼t(ij) ¡ #fj : ij 2 ggd: (2)
where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j, and
c is the cost per link that i has to pay for each direct link. Here, the total




The nature of strongly eﬃcient graphs depend upon the relative values of
¼ and d. If d < ¼¡¼2, then the complete graph ˜ g is strongly eﬃcient. In this
case, the network structure satisﬁes both link monotonicity as well as IRL.
A star graph7 encompassing all agents is the unique strongly eﬃcient graph
for intermediate values of d.
If d > ¼ + (N¡2
2 )¼2, then the empty graph is the unique strongly eﬃcient
graph.
3.2 Group Insurance
Consider a group of n identical rural communities who are isolated in period
zero. In each subsequent period, communities have random endowments.
That is, any community i can have a “high” endowment with probability
7A star graph is one where there is a central node to which every other node is connected, and there are
no other links.p, and low endowment with the residual probability. These probabilities
are independent. Normalize the high endowment to equal one unit and low
endowment to equal zero units. Each community is risk-averse, with v being
the common increasing, strictly concave utility function.
Any two communities can be connected at a cost of d. Here, the connection
cost could represent the cost of communication. Any group of connected
communities can mutually insure each other. Suppose the insurance contract
is that each member of the group will get an equal share of the total realized
endowment net of the costs of the links.
Suppose C(g) = fc1;c2;:::;cKg. With some abuse of notation, let k





















Of course, eﬃciency requires that each component be minimally connected
as long as d > 0: The properties of the network structure depend on the
functional form of the utility function v. It is of some interest to identify con-
ditions under which the graph containing all n rural communities is strongly
eﬃcient.














We want to identify conditions under which ai(m) is increasing in m. Taking






































If v000 (x), 0 < x < 1 is small, we can ignore the remainder term to obtain









By assumption, v00(0) < 0. It follows that ai(m) is increasing in m. It is
easily checked that there are strictly increasing, concave utility functions for
which v000 (x) is small for 0 < x < 1. An example is the utility function
v(x) = Kx ¡ x2
2 , K > 1. Outside [0;1], v(x) can always be extended so that
it continues to be strictly increasing and concave. However, in general, ai(m)
is not necessarily increasing in m.3.3 Networks of Collaboration in Oligopoly.
This is due to Goyal and Joshi (2003).8 Consider an oligopoly setting where
ﬁrms form pairwise collaborative links with other ﬁrms. The collaboration
could involve joint research activities, sharing knowledge about markets, shar-
ing facilities such as distribution channels. A collaboration link between ﬁrms
i and j yields lower costs of production for the two ﬁrms. Any collaboration
network thus induces a distribution of costs across ﬁrms. Given these costs,
ﬁrms subsequently compete on the product market as Cournot oligopilists.
Assume that initially all ﬁrms have zero ﬁxed costs, and constant returns-
to-scale cost functions. The initial marginal cost of ﬁrm i is ci0. Given a
graph g, let ¹i(g) denote the number of ﬁrms with which i has collaboration
links in g. Then, the resulting marginal cost of ﬁrm i is:
ci(g) = ci0 ¡ °¹i(g):
where ° > 0 is the cost reduction induced by each link formed by a ﬁrm.9
Suppose the inverse market demand curve is linear :
p = a ¡ q
The output produced by ﬁrm i in the Cournot game will be:
qi(g) =
(a ¡ nci0 +
P




8See also Goyal and Moraga(2001).
9Assume that ° is small, so that net marginal cost is always positive for each ﬁrm.The proﬁt will be (qi(g))2. Notice that the proﬁt of ﬁrm i increases if i
sets up an additional link with say ﬁrm j. While this additional link also
reduces ﬁrm j’s cost, the overall eﬀect on ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is positive. Hence,
the network structure satisﬁes link monotonicity. On the other hand, an
additional link by two rival ﬁrms k and l reduces ﬁrm i’s proﬁt. So, the
network structure does not satisfy IRL.
4 Process of Network Formation
Suppose that at any date, a pair of players i and j is randomly chosen (with
uniform probability) and endowed with the capacity to take actions at that
date. Each of these players can unilaterally sever any existing link with any
other player, and they can bilaterally form a link between the two of them if
one doesn’t exist to begin with. These actions create a (possibly) new graph,
and then one-period payoﬀs are received according to the given allocation
rule. The current period then ends, and the whole process begins again ad
inﬁnitum.
Thus there are two components of a strategy in force: unilateral, which
involves link severance, and bilateral, which involves link creation (and will
generally be correlated across the relevant actors). Throughout, we will as-
sume that players follow Markov strategies; i.e., their actions will be presumed
to depend only on the existing payoﬀ-relevant state.Because strategies involve some elements of correlation and independence,
we will need to be more speciﬁc and careful in describing them. Suppose that
two individuals “partially cooperate”, as they do here in setting up a bilateral
link, but also take independent actions, as they do here with link destruction.
Then all matters related to the bilateral link between i and j are commonly
observed by the two players, and can therefore serve as correlation devices:
either player can condition his other unilateral actions on the fate of this
link. For instance, when a “bilateral deviation” occurs from some ongoing
prescribed strategy, both players will be aware of this and can condition their
independent actions on such deviation. In contrast, a unilateral deviation by
i that breaks links other than the one with j cannot be used as a conditioning
device by j. This suggests that the situation is formally equivalent to one in
which (at any date) actions pertaining to the ij link are taken “ﬁrst” and
these are “followed” by the unilateral actions pertaining to all other existing
links.10 Let us make this approach more formal.
It will be useful to deﬁne a principal state as a collection s = (g;ij), where
g is the historically given graph and ij is the chosen active pair. Deﬁne an
intermediate state as a collection s = (g;ij;³), where g and ij are as before,
and ³ is a variable which takes the value 0 if the pair ij is not linked, and
the value 1 if ij is linked. An intermediate state doesn’t physically exist; it
is a conceptual halfway point for deﬁning unilateral actions; hence the choice
10The phrases that suggest chronology are deliberately in quotes because no real chronology is implied.of terminology. In contrast, a principal state physically exists at the start
of a period. When there is no need for a distinction, we shall simply use
“state” to denote either of the two varieties. Notice, too, that we use the
same notation s which will also ease the writing.
For any intermediate state s = (g;ij;³), deﬁne Di(s) ´ fk 6= jjik 2 gg,
and likewise deﬁne Dj(s). These are the sets of existing linkages to i, but
never counting j. As already discussed, a bilateral action to create (or main-
tain) the link between an active pair is not undone at the intermediate state.
This does not mean that unilateral breaking of an ij-link is not permitted;
it certainly is but only at the principal state. Put another way, such actions
are commonly experienced and can serve as correlating devices for actions on
the “unilateral domains” Di(s) and Dj(s).
Moreover, note that by assumption, i and j can break links on their uni-
lateral domains; no links other than those pertaining to the active pair can
be created during the period.
Formally, then, (mixed) actions may be described as follows. At any prin-
cipal state s with active pair ij it is simply a probability ¹(s) = q of bilateral
linkage between i and j. At any intermediate stage s with active pair ij it is a
collection ¹(s) ´ fºi;ºjg, where for each k = i;j, ºk is a probability measure
deﬁned over all subsets (including the empty subsets) of Dk(s).11 We will let
11As a matter of notation, we should also index the individual º-components by s, but this is notationally
cumbersome and hopefully the context will prevent any confusion.¹ stand for the entire proﬁle of ¹(s)’s over all states (notice that ¹(s) has a
diﬀerent interpretation depending on what sort of state we are looking at),
and refer to ¹ as a strategy proﬁle.
A strategy proﬁle precipitates — for each state s, principal or intermediate
— some probability measure ¸s over the feasible set F(s) of future networks
starting from s. In particular, a Markov process is induced on the set S of
principal states: at any principal state s, ¸s describes the movement to a new
network, and the given random choice of active players moves the system to
a new active pair.
The process creates values for each player. Assuming that the ak’s are
vN-M payoﬀs, we can write — for every state s with active pair ij — the
overall payoﬀ to any person k (under the strategy proﬁle ¹) as the unique








where ±i 2 (0;1) is the discount factor of agent i, ¸s is the probability over
F(s) associated with ¹, ¼(i0j0) is the probability that a pair i0j0 will be active
“tomorrow”, and s0 stands for the principal state (g0;k0`0). [Note that Vk is
well-deﬁned on both principal and intermediate states.]








Loosely speaking, an equilibrium process of network formation is a strategy
proﬁle ¹ with the property that there is no active pair at any state s which
can beneﬁt –either unilaterally or bilaterally — by departing from ¹(s). The
beneﬁt is evaluated according to the value function introduced above. The
remainder of this section contains a precise formulation of this idea. Before
the formalities are introduced, however, note the following points:
[1] Proﬁtable deviations are not necessarily myopic: individuals take the on-
going process as given and evaluate the entire stream of consequences arising
from a single action. One can imitate perfectly myopic behavior by taking
the discount factor to zero, and perfect farsightedness by taking the opposite
limit.
[2] Network formation and payoﬀs occur together. There is no “waiting” in
the model until some “stable” network is formed, following which payoﬀs
are assigned. Indeed, our deﬁnition permits cycles and continued ﬂux in the
network, and there is no diﬃculty at all in evaluating overall payoﬀs.Now for a precise account. Fix some ongoing strategy proﬁle ¹ and an
intermediate state s with active pair ij. A unilateral move for i at s (to be
sometimes referred to as an i-unilateral move at s when it’s necessary to keep
track of the relevant agent) is simply a collection ¹0(s) = fº0
i;ºjg, where the
jth component cannot be altered from that of ¹(s). (Likewise for j.) Given
a principal state s, a bilateral move for the active pair ij is a new probability
¹0(s) of ij-linkage. A unilateral move for i at the principal state s is also a
new probability ¹0(s) of ij-linkage, but it “takes eﬀect” only if the ij-linkage
is present in the historically given graph. That is, i can unilaterally decide
to alter the probability of the ij-linkage provided i and j are already linked
together.
In words, unilateral moves for an agent can either destroy ij-linkage and/or
other existing linkages on that agent’s unilateral domain. Of course, an i-
unilateral move cannot prescribe changes on j’s unilateral domain. A bilateral
move can only create ij-linkage (everything else belongs to the unilateral
domains). Now, in part this compartmentalization is a matter of semantics.
For instance, suppose that at some principal state s = (g;ij), ij is unlinked
for sure; that is, q(s) = 0. So the intermediate state s0 = (g;ij;1) will never
happen. Nevertheless, the actions ¹(s0) = (ºi;ºj) are still speciﬁed, even
though they don’t kick in under ¹. Now if a bilateral move or “deviation”
links ij, the play will generally change on other fronts as well, as the unilateral
action pairs “switch” from ¹(g;ij;0) to ¹(g;ij;1). More on these mattersbelow.
Now, ﬁx some proﬁle ¹ and a state s (principal or intermediate). For any









where s0 is the principal state (g0;i0j0). For an intermediate state s with active
pair ij, and for some k = i;j, say that a k-unilateral move ¹0(s) is proﬁtable
if
Vk(s;¹;¹0(s)) > Vk(s;¹;¹(s)); (4)
Likewise, for a principal state s with active pair ij, say that a bilateral move
¹0(s) is proﬁtable if
Vi(s;¹;¹0(s)) > Vi(s;¹) and Vj(s;¹;¹0(s)) > Vj(s;¹): (5)
A strategy proﬁle ¹ is an equilibrium if at no s is a unilateral or bilateral
move proﬁtable.
Notice how our description of equilibrium subsumes a rationality require-
ment akin to perfection.12 An equilibrium must be immune to all proﬁtable
moves, including those starting from intermediate states that may never be
reached.
12It is not the same as perfection because — properly speaking — an intermediate stage may not be
viewable as a subgame. It is a device designed to capture partial cooperation.4.2 Existence
One can establish the following
Theorem 1 An equilibrium in mixed bilateral and unilateral strategies al-
ways exists.
Proof. For every state s look at the space U(s) of all possible ¹(s). Let
U ´
Q
s2S U(s). [Note: with the obvious product topology, U is viewable as
a compact, convex subset of some ﬁnite-dimensional Euclidean space.] For
each s, we construct a nonempty-valued, convex-valued uhc correspondence
Ψs from U to U(s) in the following way.
Fix some ¹ 2 U, and consider any state s. If s is an intermediate
state with active pair ij, maximize — for each k 2 fijg — the value of
Vk(s;¹;¹0(s)) over all k-unilateral deviations from s. Gather all the mixed ac-
tions º0
k that achieve this maximum. Because Vk is linear in º0
k, this collection
is nonempty and convex: call it Ak(s;¹). Deﬁne Ψs(¹) ´ Ai(s;¹)£Aj(s;¹).
We’ve already seen that Ψs is a nonempty- and convex-valued correspon-
dence. The fact that it is uhc follows from the continuity of Vk(s;¹;¹0(s)) in
¹ and the maximum theorem.If s is a principal state with active pair ij, then denote by s0 and s1 the
two intermediate states that emerge from it. If the expression
minfVi(s1;¹) ¡ Vi(s0;¹);Vj(s1;¹) ¡ Vj(s0;¹)g
is strictly positive, deﬁne Ψs(¹) = f1g. If the expression is strictly negative,
set Ψs(¹) = f0g. If it is zero, let Ψs(¹) = [0;1].
It is obvious that for each ¹, Ψs(¹) is nonempty and convex. Using the
continuity of Vk(s0;¹) in ¹, it is straightforward to check that Ψs(¹) is uhc.
It follows from the two previous paragraphs and Kakutani’s theorem that
the product Ψ ´
Q
s2S Ψs (which is a correspondence from U to U) must have
a ﬁxed point ¹¤ in U. By construction, no proﬁtable deviation — unilateral
or bilateral — is possible from ¹¤, and therefore it is an equilibrium.
Of course, the theorem establishes the existence of equilibrium in mixed
strategies. This qualiﬁcation is important because the next example shows
that an equilibrium in pure strategies may not always exist.
Example 2 : Let I = f1;2;3g. Consider the allocation rule deﬁned below.
(i) a1(g1) = a, a2(g1) = b, where g1 = f12g, and a = b + ².
(ii) a2(g2) = a, a3(g2) = b where g2 = f23g.
(iii) a3(g3) = a, a1(g3) = b where g3 = f13g.(iv) On all other graphs g with at least one arc, w(g) is a large negative
number, and a distributes the (negative) value equally.
Suppose ¹ is a pure strategy equilibrium. We ﬁrst show that there cannot
be any absorbing graph.13 Wlog, suppose g1 is an absorbing graph. Consider
the principal state s = (g3;12). Then, since a > b, we must have ¸s(g1) = 1.
To check this assertion, note that if the assertion is not true, then either
V1(g3;¹) ¸ a
1¡± or V2(g3;¹) ¸ b
1¡±. Since V1(g3;¹) must be strictly less than
a
1¡± if ¸s(g1) = 0, the only possibility is that V2(g3;¹) ¸ b
1¡±. This possibility
too can be ruled out.
This in turn implies that g2 is also an absorbing graph since neither 2 nor
3 want to move from g2. But, if g2 is an absorbing graph, then we must
have ¸s(g2) = 1 where s = (g1;23) since a > b. This contradicts the initial
supposition that g1 is an absorbing graph.
The only other possibility is that fg1;g2;g3g form a closed set. In this
case, we have ¸s(g2) = 1 where s = (g1;23), ¸s0(g3) = 1 where s0 = (g2;13),
and ¸¯ s(g1) = 1 where ¯ s = (g3;12). Then, the following are true:





































Making appropriate substitutions and simplifying,
V2(s;¹) =
3a




(1 ¡ ±)((3 ¡ 2±)2 + ±2 + (3 ¡ 2±)±)
On the other hand, if 2 deviates at the principal state s and refuses to form the
link with 3, then g1 would be an absorbing graph, and then V2(s;(¹2;¹0
2)) =
b
1¡±: We show that for ± large enough, b
1¡± > V2(s;¹), thereby contradicting










(3 ¡ 2±)2 + ±2 + (3 ¡ 2±)±)





















This establishes that ¹ is not an equilibrium since ² can be chosen smaller
than b.5 Sustaining Eﬃciency
An issue in this general setting that merits special attention is the question of
network eﬃciency. It hardly needs mentioning that the eﬃciency question is
fundamental: the “Coase theorem” tells us that under free and unrestrained
negotiation, with the ability to write unlimited binding agreements, the equi-
librium outcome must be eﬃcient. Whether or not the “Coase Theorem” is
true is a complex question: it depends on how one models “free and unre-
strained negotiation”: there are conceptual diﬃculties in a precise description
of what exactly this phrase means. A more modest goal is to describe small
departures from the unrestrained ideal, and see how much of an eﬃciency
failure (if at all) takes place.
The great merit of the current setup is that it captures one central aspect
of free negotiation, which has to do with continued renegotiation. In this
framework, links can be altered continually, and if there is little discounting
of the future, this means that there is essentially vast scope for continued
movement with very little cost. Does this give rise to eﬃcient outcomes?
Our results suggest that the answer to this question is far from easy.
We have already provided alternative deﬁnitions of eﬃcient networks.
There is then the question of what it means for network formation processes
to yield these eﬃcient outcomes. These have to do with concepts of absorp-
tion: an eﬃcient state (however deﬁned) may be strongly absorbing (in thesense that it attracts the process from all initial conditions), or it may be
just a stationary state (other weak deﬁnitions, such as recurrence, are also
possible).
The most satisfactory situation is one in which all equilibrium strategy
proﬁles result in transition probability matrices which have the property that
all closed sets are contained in the set of eﬃcient graph(s). This would ensure
that even if mistakes are made along the way14 the process of network for-
mation converges to some eﬃcient graph(s) with probability one. Of course,
this is an extremely strong requirement, and one that we should not normally
expect to be satisﬁed. For instance, even if players are farsighted, there is no
reason why they should be able to ensure that “static” coordination failures
are avoided.
In order to demonstrate that the issue of sustaining eﬃciency in this frame-
work is not a trivial proposition, we also show that there are network struc-
tures in which no equilibrium strategy proﬁle can sustain any eﬃcient network
as a strongly absorbing state. This can be viewed as the dynamic counterpart
of the conﬂict between (static) stability and eﬃciency demonstrated by Jack-
son and Wolinsky (1996). To show this, say that an allocation rule allows
limited transfers if ai(g;w) · w(g) for all i whenever w(g) ¸ 0.
An allocation rule which allows limited transfers does not permit other
14By “mistakes” we mean non-equilibrium behavior. If mistakes are not made, then it is suﬃcient to
consider whether all paths starting from the empty graph converge to some eﬃcient graph.individuals to “overcompensate” any individual.
Theorem 2 Let the allocation rule a be anonymous and allow limited trans-
fers. Then there is w and ¯ ± < 1 such that for all ± 2 (¯ ±;1) no eﬃcient graph
(relative to (a;w)) is strongly absorbing at any pure strategy equilibrium pro-
ﬁle.
Proof. Let I = f1;2;3g. Choose w such that wfijg = 2®, wfij;ik;jkg =
3®, wfij;jkg = 0, where ® > 0. Since a is anonymous, ak(fijg) = ® for
k = i;j. Similarly, each agent gets ® at the complete graph. Finally, the
limited transfers property ensures that each agent gets 0 at fij;jkg.
The unique eﬃcient graph here is the complete graph. We want to show
that there is no pure strategy equilibrium at which ˜ g is strongly absorbing.15
Suppose instead that ¹¤ is a pure strategy equilibrium for which ˜ g is
strongly absorbing. Since all subsequent statements are with reference to
this strategy proﬁle, we will simply write Vi(g), etc., instead of Vi(g;¹¤).
We also use the notation fijg !ik g to denote that the network fijg is
changed to g at the principal state (fijg;ik) according to ¹¤.
Then, the following are true:
15However, there are pure strategy equilibria in which ˜ g and each of the one-link graphs are absorbing.(F1) fijg !ij fijg.
(F2) fijg !ik g 6= fijg and fijg !jk g0 6= fijg for k = 2 fi;jg.
Note that if (F2) does not hold at some fijg, then fijg must be an absorbing
graph at any equilibrium, which contradicts the supposition that ˜ g is strongly
absorbing.
If ˜ g is to be strongly absorbing, then there must exist some principal state
s = (fijg;ik) such that fijg !ik fij;ikg. Wlog, let s = (f12g;13), and
denote g = f12;13g. Then,
V1(s) = ±V1(g) =
±®
(3 ¡ 2±)(1 ¡ ±)
(7)
Case 1: Suppose f12g !23 f12;23g = g0.
Suppose 1 deviates from ¹¤ at s by refusing the link with 3, but retains
the link with 2. Denoting the resulting discounted payoﬀs by V 0
1,
V 0





[2® + 2±V 0
1(f12g) + ±V 0
1(g0)]
=
3® + ±2V 0
1(g0)
3 ¡ 2±
Using V1(g0) = V1(g),
V 0
















But, then ¹¤ cannot be an equilibrium.
Case 2: Suppose f12g !23 f23g.16
We let the reader check that if f23g !13 f13g, then 2 is better oﬀ by re-
taining the link with 1 and refusing to form the link with 3 at s0 = (f12g;23).
So, we only need to check for the case f23g !13 f13;23g = g00 and
f23g !12 f12g.17
In this case, we have to consider speciﬁcations of ¹¤ at principal states
involving the network f13g.
Case 2(a): Suppose f13g !12 f12g and f13g !23 f13;23g.
Then,








16In view of (F2), this is the only remaining possibility.
17If f23g !13 f13;23g, then it cannot be the case that f23g !12 f12;23g. Simply apply the proof of Case
1 to establish that 2 will then have a proﬁtable deviation at the principal state (f23g;12).Suppose 1 deviates from ¹¤ at the principal state (f13g;12), by retaining
the link with 3 and refusing to form the link with 2. Denoting the resulting
discounted payoﬀs by V 0,
V 0















(3 ¡ 2±)2(1 ¡ ±)
> V1(f12g):
Hence, ¹¤ cannot be an equilibrium in this case.
Case 2(b): Suppose f13g !12 f12;13g and f13g !23 f23g
In this case, 3 has a proﬁtable unilateral deviation at (f13g;23) - 3 can
retain link with 1 and refuse to form link with 2.
Case 2(c): Suppose f13g !12 f12g and f13g !23 f23g.
Then,






































Now, suppose 3 deviates at the intermediate state so that after forming a link





3(f13g;23) ¡ V3(f13g;23) =
3®±




This is positive for ± large enough.
Also, note that 2 is better oﬀ forming the link with 3 rather than remaining
at f13g, even if 3 refuses to cut the link with 1. Hence, ¹¤ cannot be an
equilibrium in this case either.
Using (F2), this exhausts all possible cases, and so establishes the theorem.
Notice that the complete graph may be absorbing at some equilibrium.
However, if the process of network formation “starts” at the empty network,
then the complete graph will never be reached at any equilibrium — only one-
link graphs will form. So, this example illustrates the importance of eﬃcient
graphs being sustained as strongly absorbing graphs.In what follows, we both simplify and extend the logic of ineﬃcient out-
comes. The simpliﬁcation is that we select the equilibrium in question (The-
orem 2 applied to all equilibria). But we extend the argument in the sense
that we provide a set of conditions (not just an example) under which the
complete network is strongly absorbing (for some equilibrium). At the same
time, the complete network may be ineﬃcient.
Speciﬁcally, we now show that if the network structure satisﬁes link mono-
tonicity, then the complete graph ˜ g can be supported as a strongly absorbing
graph at some equilibrium strategy proﬁle. [However, we also give an exam-
ple to show that the complete graph is not necessarily strongly absorbing at
all equilibria.]
Theorem 3 Suppose (a;w) satisﬁes link monotonicity. Then, for all ± 2
(0;1), there is some equilibrium ¹¤ such that ˜ g is strongly absorbing.
Proof. Consider the strategy proﬁle ¹¤ where at any principal state (g;ij),
i and j form the link ij (if unlinked), and do not sever any existing link in
g. We show that such ¹¤ is an equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
It will be suﬃcient to show that
For all g; for all ij = 2 g;Vi(g + ij;¹¤) > V (g;¹¤): (8)
We prove that (8) is true by induction on the number of links (“distance”)
that separates g from ˜ g.If g and ˜ g are separated by a single link, then g = ˜ g ¡ ij. In this case,
given the strategies of all players, i and j obtain (in each period) precisely
ai(g;w) and aj(g;w) as long as they do not form a link, and ai(˜ g;w) and
aj(˜ g;w) if they do. So given link monotonicity, (8) is trivially true in this
case.




. This is the number of all possible pairs, and there-
fore also the maximal distance between ˜ g and any g. Suppose, inductively,
that for 2 · K · M, (8) holds for all g which are at a distance of K ¡ 1 or



















(M ¡ K)ai(g;w) + ai(g0;w) + ±Vi(g0;¹¤) +
P
kl= 2g0







(M ¡ K + 1)ai(g0;w) +
P
kl= 2g0
(ai(g0 + kl;w) + ±Vi(g0 + kl;¹¤))
M ¡ ±(M ¡ K + 1)
>
(M ¡ K + 1)ai(g0;w) +
P
kl= 2g0
(ai(g + kl;w) + ±Vi(g + kl;¹¤))
M¡±(M¡K+1)
(10)
where the inequality invokes both link monotonicity and the induction hypothesis (noting
that for all kl = 2 g0, g0 +kl = fg +klg+ij, and that g +kl is at a distance of K ¡1 from ˜ g).













M ¡ ±(M ¡ K)
[ai(g
0;w) ¡ ai(g;w)] > 0;
the last inequality following from link monotonicity once again. This completes the
inductive step.
Link Monotonicity does not imply that the complete graph is strongly
absorbing at all equilibria. In Example 1, it is easy to check that there can
be an equilibrium in which the one-link graph is an absorbing graph.
Finally, we turn to a positive result regarding eﬃciency. In the next theo-
rem, we show that if the network structure satisﬁes IRL, and if the allocation
rule is the component-wise egalitarian rule, then the complete graph will be
strongly absorbing at some pure strategy equilibrium proﬁle. A ﬁrst reaction
may be that this is an obvious result. After all, if ˜ g is the unique strongly
eﬃcient graph, then surely everyone has a common interest in reaching ˜ g and
then staying there? However, suppose that aggregate payoﬀs are negative for
“small” graphs. Then, all individuals prefer to join the network after it has
reached the critical threshold beyond which payoﬀs are nonnegative. So, it
is a non-trivial issue to show that free-riding behaviour does not become so
pervasive so as to prevent the network formation process from converging to
the complete network.
The following example illustrates the nature of the free-riding behavior
when the network structure satisﬁes IRL.Example 3 Let N = f1;2;3g, w(g) = ¡4 if #g = 1, w(fij;jkg) = ¡3;w(˜ g) =
3. Suppose the allocation rule is the component-wise egalitarian rule.
Then, it cannot be an equilibrium for all pairs to form a link at all net-
works. For suppose, both 1 and 2 want to form additional links at each
opportunity. This then allows 3 to free ride. To check this, let V3 denote dis-
counted payoﬀs if 3 also agrees to form a link at each opportunity. Routine






(3 ¡ ±)(3 ¡ 2±)
+
2±2
(3 ¡ ±)(3 ¡ 2±)(1 ¡ ±)
On the other hand, if 3 refuses to form the ﬁrst link, but is willing to form











Of course, whether free-riding will take place or not depends on the speciﬁc
parameter values. For instance, if ± is “close” to 1, and if w(˜ g) is suﬃciently
large relative to the absolute values of other graphs, then all agents will want
to form additional links at each opportunity.
Theorem 4 Suppose the network structure satisﬁes IRL. Then, for all ±
suﬃciently large, there is an equilibrium strategy proﬁle such that ˜ g is strongly
absorbing.Proof: If a component c is nonsingleton and w(c) ¸ 0, call it nonnegative.
Deﬁne a strategy proﬁle ¹¤ as follows. Consider any state s = (g;ij).
(I) If either i or j (or both) are members of some nonnegative component
of g (perhaps diﬀerent ones), then i and j retain all existing links and
form the link ij if it did not exist before (and if s is a principal state).
(II) Otherwise, i and j follow any equilibrium strategy proﬁle in the “re-
stricted” game where strategies follow (I) whenever (I) applies.18
Notice that in Case I, the immediate payoﬀs of both i and j must go
up (this is easy to verify using the deﬁnition of IRL). This means that link
monotonicity is satisﬁed on the subdomain in which (I) applies. Because w
is additive, the behavior speciﬁed by (I) is an equilibrium, by Theorem 3. So
¹¤ is an equilibrium in the overall game.
We will now show that the equilibrium entails convergence to ˜ g. To this
end, we ﬁrst claim
Fact 1. If Vi(s;¹¤) > 0 for any state s and any i, the process must converge
to ˜ g from that state.
To prove this, let H be the set of all graphs that contain at least one non-
negative component. By (I), if the process enters H, then it must converge
18The strategy proﬁle ¹¤ is well deﬁned because our existence proof implies that an equilibrium will exist
in the restricted game.to ˜ g a.s. But if the process does not ever enter H, then no player can ever
earn a strictly positive payoﬀ, by the deﬁnition of IRL. This proves Fact 1.
Fact 2. There exists a ¯ ± 2 (0;1) such that for all ± ¸ ¯ ± and for any graph
g, there is some stage of the form s = (g;ij) where the active players i and
j earn a positive payoﬀ.
To show this, ﬁrst note that once the process enters H, there is a stochastic,
bounded time (independent of ±) within which the complete graph ˜ g will be
reached. Notice that ai(˜ g;w) > 0 for all i, so for any i,
Vi(s;¹¤) ¸ Vi(±);
for some function Vi(±) which goes to +1 as ± ! 1.
Now, take any connected ¯ g = 2 H such that ¯ g + ij 2 H for some ij, and
let s = (¯ g;ij). Both i and j can get at least ±Vk(±) (for k = i;j) by forming
the link ij. This means that their equilibrium payoﬀ is strictly positive. It
follows from Fact 1 that from s the process must converge to ˜ g almost surely.
Let q ´ jfklj(¯ g + kl) 2 Hgj. Then the following is immediate: The
probability that the network process converges to ˜ g from ¯ g is at least
q
M.
Next, observe that the (stochastic) time to any pair being active is a
bounded random variable, independent of the discount factor. Moreover, any
active pair can always break all links. Therefore, there is ﬁnite L, independentof the discount factor, such that for all states s and for all individuals i,
Vk(s;¹¤) ¸ ¡L no matter what the discount factor is.
Now, take any g0 and kl such that g + kl = ¯ g, and consider s0 = (g;kl).
Since kl can form the link kl, for each i 2 fk;lg







Notice that for suﬃciently large values of ±, Vi(s0;¹¤) ! 1 as ± ! 1. There-
fore the active pair (k;l) enjoys a strictly positive payoﬀ at this stage.
Continuing these arguments inductively, it is possible to establish Fact 2
for all initial networks g.
Combining Facts 1 and 2, the proof of the proposition is complete.
The next example shows that “static” coordination failures can occur even
when the network structure satisﬁes IRL - the example shows that ˜ g is not
strongly absorbing at some equilibrium proﬁles even though IRL is satisﬁed.
Example 4 Suppose N = f1;2;3;4g, the network structure satisﬁes IRL,
with w(˜ g) = 4, w(fijg) = ¡100, w(g) < 0 for all other nonempty g ½ ˜ g. Let
the allocation rule be ae, and ± > 6
151.
Let ¹ be such that each pair i;j breaks all links at each (g;ij) and also
refuses to form the link ij if ij = 2 g. This makes the empty graph the stronglyabsorbing graph. To check that this is an equilibrium, we simply check in-
centives to follow this strategy proﬁle at ˜ g. First, note that for all g and
i;j,
Vi(g;ij;¹) = 0
Suppose i;j deviate at (˜ g;ij) and dont break any links. Denoting this strategy
proﬁle by ¹0, routine calculation yields
Vi(˜ g;ij;¹0) =
6(6 ¡ 151±)
(6 ¡ ±)2 < 0
This shows that ¹ is an equilibrium.References
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